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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-MAHONEY V. RFE/RLJ
INC: THE "FOREIGN LAWS" EXCEPTION TO THE ADEA-WHEN A
CoLLECIlVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT EQUALS A LAW
INTRODUCIlON

In recent years, the extent to which American laws should be
given extraterritorial application has been debated by both Con
gress and the Supreme Court. Federal agencies have also entered
this debate by providing opinions as to whether certain laws are
intended to have effect outside the United States. Often, these fed
eral institutions disagree over whether to afford extraterritorial ef
fect. In the 19908, on at least one occasion, conflicting views
resulted in the congressional overruling of a Supreme Court deci
sion limiting a statute to territorial effect. 1
In the area of employment discrimination law, this debate has
resulted in significant changes in the application of United States
laws overseas. Congress has attempted, as much as possible, to pro
vide American workers who are employed by American companies
in foreign countries substantive protections from employment dis
crimination similar to those afforded to domestic workers. Many
thousands of Americans work for American companies in foreign
countries and these employees are particularly interested in the ex
tent to which United States employment discrimination laws pro
vide them with protection. Yet, it can be difficult and problematic
to extend American law beyond our territorial borders. Experience
tells us that what is legal or customary in one country might be
illegal in a different country. Potential problems exist when United
States employment discrimination laws conflict with the laws or
customs of a foreign nation.
Congress, in an attempt to limit this possible conflict, fre
quently includes exclusionary clauses in United States laws so that
American employers are not required to comply with American law
when doing so would violate the law of the foreign country of oper
ation. When such a conflict arises, it is not always clear that the
foreign law or custom equates with a law as defined in the United
States. This anomaly presents a problem with no easy solution.
1. See infra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
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This Note will analyze the extraterritorial, or foreign, applica
tion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA").2 This Note will discuss the "foreign laws" exception to
the ADEA through a recent case of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Mahoney v. RPElRL,
Inc. 3 Specifically, this Note will consider whether an enforceable
provision in a foreign collective bargaining agreement satisfies the
requirements for exclusion from coverage of the ADEA.
Part I of this Note will discuss both the text and the legislative
history of the ADEA, as well as the important cases that provide
the basis for understanding the reasoning used in Mahoney. Addi
tionally, the opinion of the administrative agency charged by Con
gress with the responsibility for enforcing the ADEA will be
discussed. Part II will discuss both the lower court and appellate
court decisions in Mahoney. Finally, in Part III, the Note will at
tempt to rationalize the prior case law and Mahoney in an effort to
resolve the issue in this Note. Part III will additionally propose an
alternative method of resolving the issue in Mahoney.
I. THE LAW, THE

AGENCY, AND

THE

COURT

Prior to the enactment of TItle VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("TItle VII"),4 the laws of the United States provided little or
no protection for individuals against employment discrimination.
With the enactment of TItle VII, Congress provided the first sub
stantive protection to workers from discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.5 Initially, Congress did
not address discrimination on the basis of age when it enacted TItle
VII. In 1967, however, Congress passed the ADEA, providing pro
tection to American workers from age-based job discrimination.6
2.

Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 V.S.C.

§§ 621-634 (1994».

3. 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
4. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 V.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994».
5. See 42 V.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1994). For a more detailed discussion of the
creation of TItle VII and its provisions, see generally Note, Business Necessity under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98
(1974); Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964,
84 HARV. L. REv. 1109 (1971); Steven K. Sanborn, Note, Miller v. Maxwell's Interna
tional, Inc.: Individual Liability for Supervisory Employees Under Title VII and the
ADEA, 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 143 (1995).
6. The major substantive provision of the ADEA, found at 29 V.S.c. § 623(a)
(1994), makes it unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi
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The coverage provisions of the ADEA paralleled TItle VII, but the
remedial provisions paralleled those of the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA").7
A. Statutory History

As enacted in 1967, the ADEA included no specific provision
stating that the Act's scope of coverage applied extraterritorially.
The prevailing view in the courts was that the ADEA incorporated
section 13(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which stated that
"any employee whose services during the workweek are performed
in a workplace within a foreign country" was not covered by the
FLSA.8 The result of this view was to limit application of the
ADEA to the territorial United States. In 1984, to counteract this
narrow interpretation of the age discrimination statute, Congress
amended the ADEA to achieve extraterritorial effect.9
Specifically, Congress amended the definition of an "em
ployee" to include "any individual who is a citizen of the United
States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign coun
try."lO To avoid placing employers in an impossible situation, Con
gress amended section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA to include an
avoidance provision for employers when compliance with the
ADEA would force the employer to violate "the laws of the [for
eign] country."ll Although the intention to extend ADEA cover
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, tenns, condi
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would de
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.

Id.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). See Sanborn, supra note 5, at 150-51 & nn.53, 54,
56, & 61 for a discussion of the relationship between the ADEA and the FLSA.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 213(f} (1994). The leading case to hold that the ADEA did not
apply overseas because of the incorporated FLSA provision was C/eQry v. United States
Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984). For detailed discussions of the extraterritorial
provisions of the ADEA and other employment statutes, see Derek O. Barella, Note,
Checking the "Trigger-Happy" Congress: The Extraterritorial Extension of Federal Em
ployment Laws Requires Prudence, 69 IND. L.J. 889 (1994).
9. See Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(a)
(b), 98 Stat. 1767, 1792 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(f}(1) & 630(f} (1994».
10. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f} (1994).
11. § 623(f}(1}. Section 623(f}(1} makes it not unlawful for an employer
to take any action otherwise prohibited under [the ADEA] ... where such
practices involve an employee in a workplace in a foreign country, and compli
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age abroad is clearly stated by the 1984 amendment, legislative
intent in using the phrase "the laws of the country" is lacking.
However, congressional direction may be found in subsequent
amendments to other employment laws which created an extraterri
torial effect.
In 1991, the Supreme Court held that Title VII did not apply
extraterritorially, in spite of the argument to the contrary by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"),12the
agency charged with enforcement of the ADEA. In the case ,of
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,13 in holding for the respon
dent-employer, the Supreme Court applied for the first time a
"clear-statement rule" regarding extraterritorial application of any
laws of the United States. 14 This rule required Congress to clearly
state an intention to provide extraterritorial effect in order to over
come a strong presumption against extraterritorial application of
United States law. iS
ance with [the ADEA] ... would cause such employer ... to violate the laws
of the country in which such workplace is located.

Id.
12. See infra Part I.B.l for a discussion of the EEOC's authority and Part I.B.3
for the standard of deference accorded to the EEOC regarding its interpretive
guidelines.
13. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
14. See id. at 248. In his dissent in Arabian American, Iustice Marshall empha
sized the significance of the Court's new policy. "The majority converts the presump- .
tion against extraterritoriality into a clear-statement rule ...." Id. at 263 (Marshall, I.,
dissenting). Iustice Marshall argued that the majority had extended the mere presump
tion, which could be overcome by implicit legislative intention, to the clear-statement
rule, which is irrebuttable without explicit congressional wording to the contrary. See
id. at 261-66 (Marshall, I., dissenting). Iustice Marshall argued that the proper standard
was the weaker presumption standard, which would have accommodated his view that
TItle VII applied extraterritorially. See id. at 266-71 (Marshall, I., dissenting).
For discussions on the difference between presumptions and clear-statement rules,
see McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,21-22
(1963) (extraterritorial effect not given to National Labor Relations Act; clear congres
sional statement was needed because extraterritoriality of the statute would violate in
ternationallawand State Department regulations); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,
S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957) ("the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly ex
pressed" was necessary before extraterritorial effect given to a statute involving a very
"delicate field of international relations"); and Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949) (the presumption against extraterritoriality derives from "[t]he canon of con
struction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States").
15. See Arabian Am., 499 U.S. at 248. In a strong dissent, Iustice Marshall ar
gued that enough evidence existed in the legislative history to establish legislative intent
to extend TItle VII protection to Americans overseas. See id. at 266-75 (Marshall, I.,
dissenting). Justice Marshall also emphasized the EEOC's broad interpretation of TItle
VII's coverage, as well as the "long-standing interpretation of the Department of Jus
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When Arabian American was decided, Congress was in the
process of amending TItle VII. In order to overturn the Supreme
Court's holding in Arabian American, Congress chose to include in
the Civil Rights Act of 199116 a grant of extraterritorial effect to
TItle VII,17
In order to satisfy the Supreme Court's "clear-statement rule,"
Congress explicitly included in the amended TItle VII definition of
employee: "With respect to employment in a foreign country, such
term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States."18
Furthermore, Congress included in the 1991 amendments an exclu
sion provision almost identical to section 623(f)(1), which allowed
employers to avoid TItle VII if doing so would require the employer
to violate foreign law,19
Although the intent to extend coverage of TItle VII was ex
pressed clearly in the amendment and the accompanying legislative
history, far less clear was the scope of the provision providing em
ployers with a foreign law defense. Congress gave no direct clues as
to how to interpret the word "law" in the amendment. Since there
was no legislative guidance on the meaning of the "law" of the for
tice, the agency with secondary enforcement responsibility under TItle VII," which "re
inforced" the EEOC's position. [d. at 276 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Interestingly,
Justice Marshall quoted former Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia, who in a
1975 speech to the Senate Subcommittee on International Finance stated that TItle VII
implicitly applied "to the employment of United States citizens by covered employers
anywhere in the world." [d. at 277-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his concurring opin
ion in Arabian American, however, Justice Scalia argued that the EEOC's interpreta
tion was not reasonable in light of the newly created "clear-statement rule" because
"mere implications from the statutory language" could not satisfy the congressional
burden. [d. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring).
16. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. (1994».
17. See Martin Adler, Note, Nailing Down the Coffin Lid: The Rise and Fall ofthe
After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine in Title VII Litigation, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 719,
734 (1994) ("The [Civil Rights Act of 1991] legislatively overruled [the Arabian Ameri
can] decision . . . .").
18. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 100(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1077
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994».
19. The amendment states:
It shall not be unlawful under [TItle VII] for an employer ... to take any
action otherwise prohibited by [TItle VII], with respect to an employee in a
workplace in a foreign country ifcompliance with [TItle VII] would cause such
employer . .. to violate the law of the foreign country in which such workplace
is located.
[d., § 109(b), 105 Stat. at 1077 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(b» (empha
sis added).
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eign country within Title VII, one can draw no inference as to the
meaning of the "laws" within the ADEA.
B. Agency Guidance on What Constitutes a "Law"
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the pri
mary federal agency charged with the duty of enforcing United
States employment discrimination laws, including the ADEA.20
Since the phrase "laws of the country" in section 623(f)(1) of the
ADEA is not facially clear and Congress provided no explicit defi
nition for the phrase, the EEOC's definition of the phrase is poten
tially helpful and relevant. Initially, this section will detail the role
of the EEOC in interpreting the ADEA. Next, the EEOC's defini
tion of "the laws of the country" will be discussed. To determine
the importance of the EEOC's definition of section 623(f)(1), this
section will conclude by discussing the extent to which EEOC opin
ions should be recognized and enforced by the courts.
1. The Role of the EEOC under the ADEA

When Congress originally enacted ntle VII in 1964, it created
the EEOC.21 The statutory text of Title VII indicates that Congress
intended the EEOC to help admjnister22 and enforce the statute's
mandates. 23 Congress did not, however, provide the EEOC with
broad enforcement abilities. Section 706, entitled "Enforcement
Provisions," gives the EEOC the power to investigate charges of
violations of Title VII.24 The EEOC must first notify the employer
against whom the charge is made of such charge. 2S Thereafter, if
the EEOC concludes after investigating "that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall en
deavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice
by informal methods of conference, conciliation, [and/or]
persuasion. "26
Congress did not provide the EEOC with the legislative au
20. See infra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of the role of the EEOC under TItle VII
and the ADEA.
21. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705,78 Stat. 241, 258 (codi
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4).
22. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4) (providing the make-up,
powers, and obligations of the Commission).
23. See id. § 706, 78 Stat. at 259 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5)
(providing the enforcement mechanism of the Commission).
24. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b».
25. See id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2OOOe-5(b».
26. Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b».
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thority to promulgate regulations, which carry the force of law. In
stead, Congress implicitly authorized the EEOC to create
interpretive guidelines by allowing an employer to avoid TItle VII
liability if the employer relied in good faith on "any written inter
pretation or opinion of the [EEOC].''27 Under a guideline, an ad
ministrative agency provides its view of the meaning of a statutory
provision.28
When Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967, it included sub
stantially the same grant of authority to the EEOC as it granted
under TItle VII.29 The EEOC was, however, authorized to make
independent investigations for possible ADEA violations, in con
trast to the TItle VII requirement of the existence of a charge. 30
Similar to TItle VII, the EEOC has implicit authority to promulgate
interpretive guidelines of the ADEA. Section 626(e) of the ADEA
incorporates a provision of the Portal-to-Portal Act,31 which pro
vides an employer with a defense based upon a good faith "reliance
on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or
interpretation of the [enforcing] agency."32
2.

EEOC's Interpretation of Section 623(f)(1)

On March 3, 1989, the EEOC made its first official statement
on the extraterritorial application of the ADEA by issuing policy
guidelines.33 In the publication, which was signed by EEOC Chair
27.

Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 713(b), 78 Stat. at 265 (codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-12(b».

28. For a discussion of the difference between regulations, called "legislative
rules," which carry the force" of law, and "interpretive rules," which explain how an
agency will construe and enforce a statute, see 2 K.c. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
TREATISE 36 (2d ed. 1978).
29. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202,
§ 7(a)-(e), 81 Stat. 602, 604-05 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(a)-(e) (1994».
Although, as previously stated, the remedial provisions in the ADEA were based not
on Title VII, but instead on the Fair Labor Standards Act, see supra text accompanying
note 7, see also Sanborn, supra note 5, at 150-51 & nn.53, 54, 56, & 61, the provisions
providing for the filing of a charge with the agency, agency notice, and subsequent at
tempted agency reconciliation are functionally the same. See Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 7(a)-(e), 81 Stat. at 604-05 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 626(a)-(e».
30. See § 7(a), 81 Stat. at 604 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(a».
31. See § 7(e), 81 Stat. at 605 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e» (incor
porating § 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84, 89 (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 259».
32. Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 61 Stat. at 89 (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§ 259).
33. See Policy Guidance: Application of Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA) and the Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963 to American Firms Overseas,
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man Clarence Thomas, the EEOC acknowledged the potential for
conflicts of laws due to the overseas coverage of the ADEA with
out discussing what the Commission considered a valid defense
under section 623(f)(1).34 Later in 1989, however, the EEOC is
sued a second set of guidelines that considered in detail the ques
tion that had been overlooked in the original release. 35
Initially, the policy guidelines acknowledged the lack of direc
tion from Congress on what constitutes a "law," stating: "[t]he
ADEA, as well as the legislative history interpreting the Act, is si
lent as to what constitutes a 'law' for purposes of setting forth a
[section 623(f)(1)] defense."36 The EEOC's second release on sec
tion 623(f)(1) provided five hypothetical examples intended to aid
in construing the "foreign laws" exception. The second, third, and
fourth examples provided guidance on what the EEOC considered
the word "law" to mean in the statute. The first and fifth examples
concerned other issues relating to the statutory provision. 37
The second example involved company created provisions. For
the sake of clarity, the EEOC prefaced the example by stating that
"[a] 'law,' however, clearly does not include a corporationlbusi
ness's rules, regulations or policies of employment."38 The example
read as follows:
Example 2 - CP is a 64-year-old United States citizen working
in the country of Xenon for R, a United States business concern.
At the annual stockholders meeting, an amendment to the corpo
rate charter is adopted whereby the corporation must reduce any
employee's salary by 25% upon their reaching the age of 65. The
Xenon Civil Code provides that all corporate charters and
amendments to corporate charters must be registered with the
Department of Commerce. 1\vo weeks later R notifies CP of its
intent to reduce CP's salary upon CP's reaching the age of 65.
Their Overseas Subsidiaries, and Foreign Firms, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 'I 2165
(Mar. 3, 1989).
34. See id. at 2308-09.
35. See Policy Guidance: Analysis of the Sec. 4(f)(l) "foreign laws" Defense of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 'I 6524
(Dec. 5, 1989).
36. Id. at 5121.
37. Example 1 indicated that domestic coverage of the ADEA included all 50
states, the District of Columbia, and all United States territories and possessions. In all
of the listed places, the "foreign laws" defense was inapplicable. See id. Example 5
indicated that in order to invoke the "foreign laws" defense, an employer must be
forced to violate the law of the specific country in which the employee works, not a
separate country with which the employer has contact. See id. at 5124.
38. Id. at 5121.
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CP then files a charge of age discrimination with the Commis
sion. In response to CP's charge, R asserts a sec. [623(f)(l») "for
eign laws" defense as CP's continued employment at a non
reduced wage would violate its government registered company
charter.
R's defense would fail in this instance as the provisions of
R's government registered company charter do not rise to the
. level of a foreign law under sec. [623(f)(l»).39

This example indicated that section 623(f)(1) only protected em
ployers who would be forced to violate a law imposed by the gov
ernment. A self-imposed obligation, even one that received foreign
government recognition, would not provide an employer with a
defense.
The next relevant example involved the issue of the timing of
the enactment of foreign legislation that would create an otherwise
valid defense to the ADEA.
Example 3 - Assume for purposes of this example that the Re

public of Argon's Constitution provides that only a bill which
passes both houses of the legislature shall have the force and ef
fect of law within the boundaries of the country. Due to over
whelming public support by voters in Argon a measure is
introduced and passed in the lower house of government that re
quires an employer to retire employees at the age of 55. CP is a
57-year-old United States citizen working in Argon for R, an
American corporation. R notifies CP of its decision to retire CP
immediately~ CP then files a charge of age discrimination with
the Commission. 1\vo weeks later the upper house of govern
ment passes the mandatory retirement bill. R responds to CP's
charge by asserting a sec. [623(f}(l») "foreign laws" defense
grounded in the recently adopted mandatory retirement law.
A sec. [623(f)(l)] defense would not be available to R under
these circumstances as no mandatory retirement law existed at
the time of R's decision to terminate CP, i.e., only one house had
approved the measure. Of course, since the bill later became
law, it could well have a limiting effect on the available relief,
e.g., reinstatement would not be feasible. 40

This example highlighted the requirement by the EEOC that a
"foreign law" be fully in force before an employer can seek protec
tion under the defense provision. Additionally, this example im
plicitly prohibited employers from relying on any foreign
39. [d. at 5121-23.
40. [d. at 5122.
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.government enactment that did not achieve "the force and effect of
law."
The last relevant example stressed a direct causation require
ment before an employer could receive the protection of the "for
eign laws" defense.
Assume for purposes of this example that a Tho
rium law requires employers to pay an annual fee of $50 for
every active employee age 65 or above. This fee is used to fund
Thorium's program to provide workers' compensation benefits.
While the program is available to all employees in the country,
Thorium has determined that the greater frequency and amount
of benefits paid to persons 65 and older justifies the assessment.
R, a United States employer operating in Thorium, employs 50
U.S. citizens, 10 of whom are 65 or above. On the last pay period
of the year, in addition to normal deductions, R subtracts $50
from the paycheck of each person 65 or above. In responding to
charges of age discrimination filed by the 10 older workers, R
asserts that compliance with the ADEA (not deducting addi
tional money from the wages of older workers) would cause it to
violate a law of Thorium.
R's foreign law defense would fail in this hypothetical situa
tion because treating employees of all ages equally with respect
to their compensation as required by the ADEA would not
"cause" a violation of Thorium law. The law in question does not
require that individual employees 65 and above be assessed the
fee. Indeed, the Thorium law is entirely silent with respect to the
source of the levy. R had the option of paying the $500 itself or
pro rating the amount deducted among all of its employees.
Since either course of action would have satisfied the require
ments of the ADEA without causing R to violate Thorium law,
R's sec. [623(f)(1)] defense would fail.41
Example 4 -

In effect, this example prevented employers from arguing that the
excessive cost, difficulty, or burden of complying with a foreign law
would require the employer to violate that law.
Read together, the examples from the guidelines indicated an
EEOC intention that the "foreign laws" exception should be con
strued narrOWly. Example 2 indicated that the "law" which causes a
conflict must come directly from the foreign government, rather
than from the employer. The exclusionary provision should not
protect an employer whose own actions created the conflict. Exam
ple 3 indicated that employers should only rely on fully and prop
41. Id. at 5123 (emphasis added).
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erly enacted laws. Employer reliance on anything less than an
enacted provision would be improper. Finally, Example 4 indicated
that an employer could not avoid complying with the ADEA be
cause a foreign law made compliance difficult or inconvenient. The
EEOC therefore required that it be impossible to simultaneously
comply with the ADEA and the foreign law.
3. Standard of Deference Owed to the EEOC
Since the EEOC had published an interpretation of section
623(f)(1) of the ADEA, the important question is what effect that
opinion deserves. Initially, the limited legislative authority of the
EEOC affects this question.42 Since the EEOC cannot promulgate
regulations with the force of law, courts and writers alike claim that
the EEOC should not receive the highest level of judicial defer
ence.43 1\vo landmark decisions regarding administrative agency
deference provide separate rules of law to debate.
The first case, Skidmore v. Swift & Co. ,44 provided direction to
courts faced with interpretive guidelines. The Supreme Court held
that "rulings, interpretations and opinions of [an agency] ..., while
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do con
stitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance. "45 The Court then
created a four factor test which courts should use to determine
"[t]he weight of such [interpretive guidelines] in a particular case":
(1) "the thoroughness evident in its consideration," (2) "the validity
of its reasoning," (3) "its consistency with earlier and later pro
nouncements," and (4) "all those factors which give it power to per
suade, if lacking power to control."46
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 47 In Chevron, the Court
adopted a new two-part test to determine whether to afford defer
ence to an administrative agency rule with the force of law.48 First,
42. For a discussion of the authority of the EEOC and its ability to issue guide
lines, see supra notes 21-32.
43. See generally John S. Moot, Comment, An Analysis of Judicial Deference to
EEOC Interpretative Guidelines, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 213 (1987); Jamie A. Yavelberg, Note,
The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift· Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations After
EEOC v. ARAMCO, 42 DUKE L.J. 166 (1992).
44. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
45. Id. at 140.
46. Id. Hereinafter, this test will be referred to as the Skidmore test.
47. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
48. See id. Hereinafter, this test will be referred to as the Chevron test. See also
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a court must look to a statute to determine if it is clear and unam
biguous.49 If so, the court then applies this clear meaning without
concerning itself with an agency's view.50 If the statute is ambigu
ous, then the court, in step two, defers to any agency rule so long as
it is reasonable. 51 The effect of the second step is to prevent a court
from "substitut[ing] its own construction of a statutory provision for
a reasonable interpretation made by" an agency.52 In the case of
EEOC guidelines, the issue is whether the Chevron test supplants
the Skidmore test even though Chevron referred to rules with full
legislative effect.53
In attempting to determine the proper deference that should
be given to EEOC guidelines, two recent Supreme Court cases fo
cus on the issue, without giving any precise answers. In 1988, the
Supreme Court decided EEOC v. Commercial Office Products
Co. ,54 in which the Court analyzed an EEOC interpretation of Title
VII. In finding that deference was appropriate in that case, the
Court applied a standard in agreement with the Chevron test. The
Court stated that "it is axiomatic that the EEOC's interpretation of
Title VII, for which it has primary enforcement responsibility, need
not be the best one by grammatical or any other standards."55
Rather, the Court stated, "the EEOC's interpretation of ambiguous
language need only be reasonable to be entitled to deference. "56
This approach was consistent with several previous Supreme Court
decisions on deference to EEOC guidelines. 57
Three years later, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of
the extraterritorial effect of Title VII in EEOC v. Arabian AmeriYavelberg, supra note 43, at 173-75 for a further discussion of Chevron and its affect on
Skidmore.
49. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
50. See id.
51. Id. at 844-45.
52. Id. at 844.
53. Prior to Chevron, the Supreme Court treated EEOC guidelines inconsis
tently. Compare Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) and Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,434 (1971) (EEOC's interpretive guidelines "entitled
to great deference") with General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)
(using the Skidmore test to conclude the Court would not defer to a particular EEOC
guideline). If Chevron does supplant Skidmore, any reasonable EEOC interpretation
of an 'ambiguous statute would receive deference.
54. 486 U.S. 107 (1988).
55. Id. at 115.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 53 for examples of earlier cases granting the EEOC deference.
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can Oil Co. 58 The majority of the Court ignored the holding of
Commercial Office Products and instead cited to a 1976 case, Gen
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert,59 that did not use the "great deference"
standard. 6o Applying Gilbert, the Court stated that the proper stan
dard of deference to EEOC guidelines was the Skidmore test61 and
the EEOC's interpretation "[did] not fare well under [the Skidmore
test]."62 Earlier in its opinion, however, the Court had held that
TItle VII did not express a clear legislative intention to create extra
territorial effect.63 Since the "clear-statement rule"64 was not satis
fied, the proper degree of deference to be afforded to the EEOC
was not central to the Court's holding.
In concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that the Chevron reason
ableness test was the appropriate standard for· evaluating EEOC
guidelines, but that the EEOC's interpretation of TItle VII as ap
plying overseas was unreasonable in light of the "clear-statement
rule" against extraterritorial application of American laws.65 Jus
tice Scalia argued that Commercial Office Products rather than Gil
bert was the correct pronouncement on deference to the EEOC's
interpretive guidelines.66 Justice Scalia explained that the approach
in Gilbert of affording limited deference to EEOC guidelines re
sulted from a dated view that a distinction should be made between
rules with and without the force of law.67 In dissent, Justice Mar
shall agreed that the proper deference standard was to be found in
Commercial Office Products, but disagreed with both the majority
and concurrence that the EEOC's position was unreasonable.68
C.

United States Supreme Court Guidance on What Constitutes a
"Law"

In addition to agency interpretation of the meaning of "foreign
laws" in the ADEA, another source for construing the phrase is
58. 499 U.S. 244 (1991). See supra notes 13-17 for a discussion of Arabian

American.
59.

429 U.S. 125 (1976).

60. See Arabian Am. , 499 U.S. at 256-57.
61. See supra note 46 and accompanying text for the Skidmore factors.
62. Arabian Am., 499 U.S. at 257.
63. See id. at 248-53.
64. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the c1ear
statement rule.

65.
66.
67.
68.

See
See
See
See

Arabian Am. , 499 U.S. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring).
id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
id. at 259-60 (Scalia, J., concurring).
id. at 274-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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existing decisional law. This section will discuss two Supreme Court
cases that have interpreted similarly written statutory provisions
contained in statutes other than the ADEA.
1.

Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. American Train
Dispatchers' Ass'n69

In Norfolk & Western, the Supreme Court agreed to hear two
consolidated cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit that had similar factual and procedural
histories, and a common legal question.7o At issue in Norfolk &
Western was a clause in the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA"),71
section 11341(a), that exempted a rail carrier from "the antitrust
laws and from all other law, includiilg State and municipallaw."72
69. 499 U.S. 117 (1991).
70. The two cases were collectively called Brotherhood ofRy. Carmen v. ICC, 880
F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The first case, Norfolk S. Corp.- Control-Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co. and S. Ry. Co., 366 I.C.C. 173 (1982), involved the acquisition by NWS Enter
prises, Inc. of the Norfolk and Western Railway Company and the Southern Railway
Company. The Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"), pursuant to its authority,
initially approved the railroad acquisitions. Subsequently, a dispute arose regarding the
applicability of a collective bargaining agreement that covered Norfolk and Western
employees. Mandatory arbitration was triggered, resulting in a ruling adverse to the
employees. The affected employees' union, the American 'frain Dispatchers' Associa
tion, appealed to the ICC, challenging the arbitration ruling. See Norfolk & Western,
499 U.S. at 121-23.
The second case, CSX Corp.-Control-Chessie Sys., Inc. and Seaboard Coast Line
Indus., Inc., 363 I.C.C. 521 (1980), involved the acquisition by CSX Corp. of Chessie
System, Inc. and Seaboard Coast Line Industries, Inc. As in the NWS Enterprises ac
quisition, the ICC granted approval to the acquisition, a dispute arose on a collective
bargaining agreement, and arbitration returned a ruling against the employees, who
worked for Seaboard Coastline Industries in this case. The employees' union, the
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen, appealed unsuccessfully to the ICC. See Norfolk &
Western, 499 U.S. at 123-25.
Both unions appealed the adverse ICC rulings. Hearing the cases together, the
court of appeals reversed both ICC rulings, finding for the petitioner unions. Thereaf
ter, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari of the affected rail
roads, who were the respondents in the consolidated cases at the court of appeals level.
See id. at 125-26.
71. 49 U.S.C. §§ 11301-11367 (1994).
72. § 11341(a). Section 11341(a) can only be applied after the ICC has approved
a merger between transportation carriers pursuant to § 11343(a)(1). The ICC has ex
clusive authority to approve § 11343(a)(1) mergers. According to the Court, the
merger provisions of the ICA "were designed to promote 'economy and efficiency in
interstate transportation by the removal of the burdens of excessive expenditure.'"
Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 132 (quoting Thxas v. United States, 292 U.S. 522, 534
35 (1934». The Court further indicated that § 11341(a) was necessary to facilitate a
pre-approved merger. Without § 11341(a)'s avoidance provisions, these mergers would
be "difficult, if not impossible, to achieve." Id. at 133. Section 11341(a) is, however,
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Writing for the majority,73 Justice Kennedy held that this clause in
the ICA "includes any obstacle imposed by law," both "the sub
stantive and remedial laws respecting enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements. "74
In reaching its decision, the majority used the statutory analysis
formula of Chevron,15 looking first to the plain language of the stat
ute. The majority found that section 11341(a)'s exemption from
"the antitrust laws and all other law, including State and municipal
law" was "clear, broad, and unqualified," and thus facially ex
pressed the legislative intent of Congress.76 "By itself, the phrase
'all other law' indicates no limitation" and "is broad enough to in
clude laws that govern the obligations imposed by contract. "77 The
majority reasoned that the laws that enforce contractual obligations
are incorporated into a contract, and here, the ICA provision "sus
pend[s] application of the law that makes the contract binding."78
The majority also noted that its interpretation was consistent with
that of the ICC, though it was reached without affording the agency
any deference.79
Justice Stevens argued in dissentSO that section 11341(a) was
not clear on its face and that the legislative history of the ICA, con
trary to the majority's holding, indicated no intention to have the
"all other laws" provision apply to private contractual obligations,
such as the collective bargaining agreements at issue.81 Justice Ste
vens also argued that due to the historical "respect that our legal
system has always paid to the enforceability of private contracts-a
respect that is evidenced by express language in the Constitution
itself-there should be a powerful presumption against finding an
implied authority to impair contracts" in a statute such as the
constrained by a qualifying condition, which pennits the exemption from all other law
only to the extent necessary to effect the merger.
73. Joining Justice Kennedy were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter.
74. Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 133.
75. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Chevron
test.
76. Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 128.
77. [d. at 129.
78. [d. at 130.
79. See iii. at 133-34. The majority could not afford the ICC any deference once it
concluded that the statute was clear on its face because Chevron requires the Court to
apply the clear interpretation of the statute. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Chevron test.
SO. Justice Marshall joined in the dissent.
81. Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 134-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ICA.82 Further, the dissent posed a question that the majority
never addressed: Would not Congress write into the text of a statute
the intention to supersede private contracts if it so intended?83
2. American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens 84

In Wolens, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether a class action breach of contract claim against American
Airlines survived a preemption provision included in the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 ("ADA").85 The pertinent provision
within the ADA, section 1305(a)(1), stated that "no State ... shall
enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provi
sion having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or
services of any air carrier .... "86 Specifically, the Court had to
determine whether the phrase "any law" within the statute was
broad enough to encompass state common law which enforced
contracts.
In deciding Wolens, the Court faced an issue similar to that
found in Norfolk & Western, where the Court had to determine if
the phrase "all other law" in the ICA included collective bargaining
agreements, a specific type of contract.87 In Wolens, if the phrase
"any law" included private contracts, then section 1305(a)(1) would
preempt plaintiffs' allegations and a result similar to that in Norfolk
& Western would be reached. H the phrase did not include private
contracts, then the plaintiffs' common law contract claims would re
main unaffected by the preemption provision.
Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court,88 and con
cluded that section 1305(a)(1) did not preempt plaintiffs' contract
82. Id. at 139 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
83. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. 115 S. a. 817 (1995).
85. Pub. L. No. 95-504,92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (amending scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.). In Wolens, the Court also addressed the issue of whether the ADA preempted
a state consumer protection statute. Wolens, 115 S. a. at 823. The majority held that
state statutory enactments fell within the scope of the ADA provision and were pre
empted. See id. at 823-24.
86. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988) (repealed 1994) (current version at 49
U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (1994). The new prOvision replaces "relating to rates, routes, and
services" with "related to a price, route, or service." 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
ff7. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of Norfolk &
Western.
88. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined in
the majority opinion. Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's finding that the
breach of contract claims survived preemption, but dissented on a separate issue in the
case. See Wolens, 115 S. a. at 827 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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claims. The majority held that no preemption resulted because the
enforcement of private, "self-imposed undertakings . . . d[id] not
amount to a 'State's enact[ment] or enforce[ment of] any law, rule,
regulation, standard, or other provision having the force or effect of
law' within the meaning of [section] 1305(a)(l)."89 The majority,
though somewhat unclear in its reasoning process, gave several ex
planations for its holding.90 The language of the statute, according
to the majority, helped it reach its conclusion.
[T]he word series "law, rule,regulation, standard, or other provi
sion ... connotes official, government-imposed policies, not the
terms of a private contract." Similarly, the phrase "having the
force and effect of law" is most naturally read to "refe[r] to bind
ing standards of conduct that operate irrespective of any private
agreement."91

Additionally, the majority looked to the broad purpose of the
ADA for guidance, which the Supreme Court had previously said
was "to promote 'maximum reliance on competitive market
forces."'92 In finding this broad purpose better supported by find
ing section 1305(a)(l) to not impair contracts, the majority ac
knowledged the proposition that" '[t]he stability and efficiency of
the market depend fundamentally on the enforcement of [private]
89. Woiens, 115 S. Ct. at 824 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Cu
riae at 9).
90. It is not apparent from the opinion whether the majority found § 1305(a)(1)
facially clear, as did the majority in Norfolk & Western, or whether the majority found
the text of § 1305(a)(1) ambiguous, and looked to the statute as a whole, the legislative
history, and the interpretation of the relevant administrative agency. Additionally, if
the latter course was used, the extent to which the majority credited the agency inter
pretation is uncertain. Unlike the Norfolk & Western Court, which immediately cited
to Chevron as a guide for the process of interpreting statutory text, see Norfolk & West
ern Ry. Co. v. American nain Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 128 (1991), the Wolens
majority gave no indication that it was following precedent or an interpretive plan.
91. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824 n.5 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Cu
riae at 16). In the same footnote, the Court also acknowledged that the use of the word
"enforce" could "perhaps be read to preempt even state-court enforcement of private
contracts." [d. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 17). In acknowl
edging this possible interpretation, the majority fostered the confusion over how it
reached its conclusion, as the statement implied that the statute was ambiguous. With
out the statement, the most likely conclusion would have been that the majority found
the statute to be clear on its face. If the majority did believe the statute was ambiguous,
it should have simply deferred to the Department of nansportation's interpretation,
which was the same as the majority's, as reasonable and controlling under Chevron.
For a discussion of the Chevron test for statutory construction, see supra notes 47-52
and accompanying text.
92. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824 (quoting Morales v. nans World Airlines, Inc., 504
U.S. 374, 378 (1992».
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agreements freely made, based on needs perceived by the con
tracting parties at the time."'93 Finally, Justice Ginsburg noted that
the statutory and regulatory schemes regarding air transportation,
when viewed generally, supported the majority's conclusion.94
In a footnote, the majority defended its seemingly conflicting
decision in Norfolk & Western,95 which the defendant had argued as
support for its interpretation of section 1305(a)(1) of the ADA.
"We read the exemption clause to empower the ICC to override,
individually, a carrier's obligations under a collective-bargaining
agreement. Our reading accorded with the ICC's and 'ma[de] sense
of the consolidation provisions."'96 The majority further noted that
without ICC preemption of collective bargaining agreements, "'rail
carrier consolidations would be difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve. '''97
Thereafter, relying on its explanation for the Court's decision
in Norfolk & Western, the majority argued that the two cases were
consistent because both made sense in the context of the statutory
scheme being interpreted. The Court stated "[s]imilarly in this
case, our reading of the statutory formulation accords with that of
the superintending agency, here, the DOT, and is necessary to
make sense of the statute as a whole. "98
In dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that state contract claims
should be preempted by the ADA.99 Justice O'Connor argued that
the interpretation relied on in Norfolk & Western should apply to
section 1305(a)(1) of the ADA.100 The dissent stressed the require
ment that contractual obligations can only be enforced by state con
tract law, common or statutory, which should be preempted by the
ADA under the broad reading of "law" used in Norfolk &
Western. lOl
93. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 23).
94. See id. at 825-26.
95. See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text for a description of the Norfolk
& Western case.
%. Wolens, 115 S. Q. at 824 n.6 (citing Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. American
1i"ain Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 132 (1991».
97. Id. (quoting Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 133).
98. Id.
99. See id. at 828-29 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis
senting in part). Justice O'Connor, joined in part by Justice Thomas, concurred in the
Court's holding that the state statutory claims were preempted. See id.
100. See id. at 831 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent
ing in part). See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ADA.
101. See ill. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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Norfolk & Western and Wolens gave the Supreme Court the
opportunity to decide two similar cases involving disputes over the
applicability of contractual agreements in light of potentially con
flicting statutory provisions. The Court reached opposite results in
these cases, although no single reason can be offered to explain the
differing outcomes. Nevertheless, the reasoning used by the
Supreme Court in each case is relevant and important in attempting
to reach an understanding of the similar statutory provision in the
ADEA, section 623(f)(1).
II.

MAHONEY V.

RFElRL,

INC 102

In this section, the Mahoney case will be discussed in depth.
The first part will describe the facts of the case, including the early
procedural history. Next, the opinion of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia lO3 will be discussed. The section
will conclude with a discussion of the unanimous decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.104
A. Statement of Facts
The defendant in Mahoney, RFEIRL, is best known for the
broadcast services it provides, Radio Free Europe and Radio Lib
erty.10S A non-profit corporation operating under Delaware laws,
RFEIRL's principal place of business is Munich, Germany, where it
employs some 300 American workers. 106
In 1982, the defendant and the defendant's employees entered
into a collective bargaining agreement that required the mandatory
retirement of most employees at age sixty-five. 107 The collective
bargaining agreement was to continue indefinitely, but the parties
could mutually change the agreementl08 or either party could termi
nate the agreement by giving six months notice. lOO
After the 1984 amendment of the ADEA gave the statute ex
102. 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
103. Mahoney v. RFEJRL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1992).
104. Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 447.
105. See Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 2.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 3. "The contract ... contains exceptions to the mandatory retire
ment provision for certain managerial positions and for employees who would qualify
for pension benefits within three years." [d.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 5.
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traterritorial effect,l1O RFEIRL believed its American employees
would be able to work past the age of sixty-five. 1ll RFEIRL ap
plied to the company's "Works Council"ll2 for permission to make
individual agreements with American workers to comply with the
ADEA.113 The "Works Council" refused permission, after which
the defendant appealed to a German Labor Court.n4 The German
court, upholding the "Works Council" ruling, refused to permit the
defendant to avoid the contested provision of the collective bar
gaining agreement. 11S
Thereafter, the defendant continued to comply with the provi
sions of the collective bargaining agreement, resulting in the termi
nation of plaintiff Roy De Lon in 1987 and plaintiff William G.
Mahoney in 1988.116 In January of 1989, the EEOC concluded that
a violation of the ADEA had occurred and filed suit against RFEI
RL.ll7 On May 4, 1990, after several months of discovery, the
EEOC, believing that it would not prevail in the case, filed a Mo
tion for Dismissal of Commission Suit Without Prejudice.u s Both
the EEOC and the trial judge were concerned about the continuing
viability of a suit by individuals aggrieved by the defendant's al
110. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1984
amendment.
111. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). For the
factual history of the case, the court of appeals's report is often more complete and will
be cited as necessary in this section.
112. A "Works Council" is a required unit in Germany for firms with twenty or
more employees. See id. "They are bodies elected by both unionized and nonunion
ized employees. Their duties include [e]nsuring that management adheres to all provi
sions of union contracts. Departures from contractual requirements are illegal without
the Works Council's approval." Id.
113. See Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 5.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 448.
117. See EEOC v. RFEIRL, Inc., No. 89-0153 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 23, 1989). The
EEOC had prior knowledge of RFEIRL's termination policies. In 1985, RFEIRL suc
cessfully fought a suit challenging the mandatory age sixty-five retirement. In that case,
the plaintiff filed suit prior to the 1984 amendment to the ADEA. The D.C. Circuit
determined that the amendment to the ADEA did not apply retroactively, an opinion
shared by the EEOC. See Ralis v. RFEIRL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
118. See EEOC v. RFEIRL, Inc., No. CIV.A.89-0153-LFO, 1990 WL 154321, at
*1 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1990). The EEOC did not indicate in any way that it believed it
had been mistaken in filing suit against RFEIRL. Later EEOC policy guidelines indi
cate that the EEOC continued to believe a violation of the ADEA had occurred. See
Seniority Systems, Extraterritoriality, and Coverage of Federal Reserve Banks, EEOC
Enforcement Guidance, No. N-915.002, Oct. 20, 1993, available in WESTLAW, 1993
DLR 203 d27, at 34-35 (stating that Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc. involved a situation in
which the "foreign laws" defense to the ADEA "clearly [was not] available").
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leged discriminatory policies because the statute of limitations for
filing a direct suit had expired. 119
On October 30, 1990, the trial judge, the EEOC, and RFEIRL
reached an agreement that RFEIRL would waive the statute of lim
itations, allowing the individuals 270 days to commence a suit, in
exchange for the granting of the EEOC's voluntary dismissal mo
tion.120 Thereafter, in 1991, plaintiffs Roy De Lon and William G.
Mahoney filed suit in the United States District Court for the Dis
trict of Columbia seeking damages for an unlawful discharge in vio
lation of section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA.121
B.

Opinion of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia

At trial, the defendant conceded that it had terminated the
plaintiffs on the basis of age. 122 However, the defendant claimed
that section 623(f)(1) shielded it from liability because compliance
with the ADEA would require it to violate German law. 123
The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the is
sue of liability, requesting that the trial proceed immediately to a
determination of damages. 124 Similarly, the defendant moved for
summary judgment on its affirmative defense. 125
To receive the protection of section 623(f)(1), the defendant
attempted to establish that noncompliance with the mandatory re
tirement provision in the collective bargaining agreement would re
quire it to violate a "law" as defined in the statute. The defendant
argued "that a mandatory retirement age is a deeply embedded
concept in German labor practice" and that it is "'general policy of
. the unions' to insist upon a mandatory retirement age."126 The de
fendant then presented an expert who testified that collective bar
gaining agreements have" 'legal' force" in Germany, because they
are legally binding. 127 The defendant sought to equate such collec
tive bargaining agreements with "the laws" of Germany to receive
the protection of section 623(f)(1).
119. See RFElRL, 1990 WL 154321, at *1.
120. See EEOC v. RFEIRL, Inc., No. CN.A.89-0153-LFO, 1990 WL 179908, at
*1 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 1990).
121. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1992).
122. See ill. at 3.
123. See ill.
124. See ill. at 2.
125. See ill.
126. Id. at 3.

127. Id.
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In rejecting the defendant's central argument, the district court
listed two important and undisputed findings of fact regarding the
retirement provision. "First, the provision is part of a contract be
tween an employer and unions-both private entities-and has not
in any way been mandated by the German government. Second,
the provision does not have general application, as laws normally
do, but binds only the parties to the contract."128 The court found
particularly unpersuasive the argument that "practice" and "policy"
were enough to bring the collective bargaining agreement within
the scope of "law" in section 623(f)(1).129
Since the district court found that RFEIRL's principal argu
ment was flawed, the defendant attempted to avoid liability with
alternative arguments. First, RFEIRL contended that it should be
exempt from the provisions of section 623(f)(1) because the dis
puted collective bargaining agreement was entered into prior to the
effective date of section 623(f)(1).130 The court disagreed with the
defendant on two separate grounds. Initially, the court noted, from
a procedural standpoint, that such "argument misse[d] the mark,"
since the defendant had raised an affirmative defense to the ADEA
which required the defendant to prove a conflict of laws. 131 The
court stated that the defendant's argument "does not go to the issue
of whether the foreign labor union 'policy' or 'practice' is law."132
Nevertheless, the court addressed the defendant's argument of the
applicability of section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA to a prior contrac
tual agreement. The court disagreed with the defendant's assertion
that the discriminatory act in question occurred in 1982.133 Rather,
the court found the time of the application of the provision, the
128. Id.
129. See id. at 34. In so holding, the court stated "[t]he ADEA is a remedial
statute and exceptions to it are to be construed narrowly." Id. {quoting Sexton v. Bea
trice Foods Co., 630 F.2d 478, 486 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing AH. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling,
324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945»). The original quote in AB. Phillips, continued as follows:
"To extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms
and spirit is to abuse the interpretative process and to frustrate the announced will of
the people." AH. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 493. The court of appeals surprisingly did not
discuss the importance of this general rule of narrowly construing exceptions. As re
cently as 1989, the Supreme Court, in Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989),
quoted the AB. Phillips rule and stated "[i]n construing provisions ... in which a
general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, we usually read the exception
narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision." Id. at 739.
130. See Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 4.

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 4-5.

1997]

"FOREIGN LAWS" EXCEPTION TO THE ADEA

477

actual termination, to be the significant time. l34 Since both plain
tiffs were terminated after section 623(f)(1) went into effect, the
court believed that the provision properly applied to the defendant.
Next, the defendant cited the decision of the German Labor
Court to which it unsuccessfully appealed the "Works Council" de
cision, subsequent to the 1984 amendment to the ADEA, denying
RFEIRL permission to employ Americans beyond age sixty-five. 135
The defendant emphasized the rulings of the Labor Court that
workers under collective bargaining agreements with age sixty-five
retirement provisions must retire at that age. 136 The court dis
missed this argument as non-responsive to the question of whether
the collective bargaining provisions in Germany are "law" within
section 623(f)(1).137 Rather, the court maintained that such rulings
only evidenced the German Labor Court's enforcement of a private
obligation between private parties. l38 As a general response to the
defendant's argument, the court provided a pragmatic policy con
sideration. "If overseas employers could avoid application of the
ADEA simply by embedding an age-discriminatory provision in a
contract, having a foreign court enforce the contract, and calling the
court's decision 'law,' then the Act's extraterritorial provisions
would be largely nullified, for employers could easily contract
around the law."139
Finally, the defendant made two other arguments that the
court similarly dismissed. FIrst, the defendant claimed to have done
all it could to comply with the ADEA, by applying to the Works
Council and the German Labor Court for permission to deviate
from the collective bargaining agreement, but failed in spite of its
best efforts.l40 The court disagreed with the defendant on this
point, claiming the defendant "could have done more to come into
compliance."141 Second, the court dismissed an unsubstantiated
claim that requiring the defendant to comply with the ADEA
134. See id.
135. See id. at 5.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. [d.
140. See id.

141. [d. This argument was particularly insincere and unpersuasive to the district
court in light of the available six-month termination provision. The defendant at
tempted to argue that a unilateral termination would not have helped because the pro
vision would continue to bind until a new agreement was reached. This argument,
however, did not convince the court. See id.
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would force the defendant to violate intemationallaw. 142 Overall,
the district court treated the defendant's supplemental arguments
as non-responsive to the court's assertions that: (1) the mandatory
retirement provision in the collective bargaining agreement was
part of a contract between the parties to the lawsuit and nothing
within German law required the defendant to agree to the provi
sion; and (2) the mandatory retirement provision in the collective
bargaining agreement binds only the parties to the agreement, not
German workers in general.143
The district court summed up the defendant's position as fol
lows: "The defendant is essentially arguing that the German unions
simply will not allow it to eliminate the mandatory retirement pol
icy."144 After this condensed argument, the district court delivered
a simplified response: "But the United States Congress will not al
low it to retain the policy. Of the two, [Congress and the Works
Council], only Congress makes law."145
C.

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit

RFEIRL appealed the lower court ruling that compliance with
its collective bargaining agreement did not result in the violation of
a foreign "law" within the ADEA.146 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the
district court's granting of the plaintiff's motion for summary judg
ment. In reaching its decision, the court of appeals relied on the
Supreme Court decision in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v.
American Train Dispatchers' Ass'n 147 which the court found to be
inconsistent with the interpretation of the district court. 148
The court of appeals began its analysis with a discussion of the
relevant legal reasoning of Norfolk & Western. In Norfolk & West
ern, the Supreme Court analyzed a collective bargaining agreement
142. See ill. at 6.
143. See ill.
144. Id. at 5-6.
145. Id. at 6.
146. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
147. 499 U.S. 117 (1991). See supra notes 69-79 for a detailed discussion of the
majority opinion in Norfolk & Western.
148. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 449. The court of appeals expressed surprise, if not
irritation, that neither party mentioned the case to the district court and neither party
included the case in the appellate brief. However, the court of appeals expressed confi
dence that the district court would have reached the same result had the parties brought
Norfolk & Western to the lower court's attention. See ill.
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in light of section 11341(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which
contained an avoidance provision "from 'all other law."'149 The
Supreme Court found that the meaning of the word "law" was
clear, and included the law that gave force and effect to collective
bargaining agreements. 150 The court of appeals drew from the
Supreme Court ruling the idea that contract law is the mechanism
to enforce contractual obligations and that a contract cannot be de
tached from this law. l5l
In comparing the relevant statutory provisions, the court be
lieved that the ICA's exemption provision and the ADEA's "for
eign laws" exception were indistinguishable. 152 The court of
appeals analyzed RFEIRL's problem with the retirement provision
in a manner consistent with Norfolk & Western. The court stated
that if RFEIRL was required by the ADEA to continue employing
American workers over the age of sixty-five, RFEIRL would be
forced to violate German laws that enforced contractual agree
ments and German Labor Court decisions. 153 Compliance with the
ADEA would therefore "cause" RFEIRL to violate foreign law. 154
Thus, section 623(f)(1) excused RFEIRL from compliance with the
ADEr\.
The court of appeals claimed that American Airlines, Inc. v.
Wolens,155 a Supreme Court case decided after oral argument in
Mahoney, did not undermine its reliance on Norfolk & Western. 156
In Wolens, decided almost four years after Norfolk & Western, the
Court construed the preemption provision included in the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 ("ADA").157 Under section 1305(a)(1),
states were prohibited from enacting or enforcing "any law ... re
lating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier."158 Unlike the
Norfolk & Western holding that the ICA could suspend private con
tractual agreements, the Supreme Court in Wolens held that private
contractual agreements were not affected by the preemption provi
[d. (quoting Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 127).
See id. (citing Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 130, 133).
See id.
See id. at 450.
See id.
154. See id.
155. 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995). See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Wolens.
156. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 450.
157. See Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 82l.
158. [d. (quoting § 1305(a)(1».
149.
150.
15l.
152.
153.
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sion in the ADA.1s9
In an attempt to reconcile the apparently inconsistent Supreme
Court holdings, the court of appeals distinguished the facts of
Wolens and Norfolk & Western. 160 The court stressed the impor
tance of contract enforcement relied on by the Wolens majority161
and pointed out that if section 1305(a)(1) of the ADA preempted
contract claims, none would be enforced because no agency was au
thorized to hear them. 162
Furthermore, the court pointed to the Wolens majority view
that the ADA incorporated by reference a statutory provision,
which "preserved 'the remedies now existing at common law."'163
In light of such "savings clause," it was necessary to read section
1305(a)(1) as not preempting private contracts. 164 Additionally, the
court noted that the Wolens majority had itself distinguished the
statute in Norfolk & Western on the grounds that without reading
section 11341(a) of the ICA as preempting collective bargaining
agreements, the statute as a whole did not make sense. 16S
Thereafter, the court of appeals asserted that "[u]nlike the situ
ation in [Wolens] , construing the foreign laws exception in the
[ADEA] consistently with Norfolk & Western would not render the
Act senseless."166 To the contrary, the court of appeals argued that
its view made sense, in light of the purpose of section 623(f)(1)'s
foreign law exemption, which was "to avoid placing overseas em
ployers in the impossible position of having to conform to two in
consistent legal regimes."167
Finally, in response to the plaintiffs' argument that the defend
ants could have bargained harder to effect a change in the contract,
as noted by the district court, the court of appeals stated that this
fact was irrelevant because the "collective bargaining agreement
here was valid and enforceable at the time of plaintiffs' termina
tions, and RFEIRL had a legal duty to comply with it" and there
159. See id. at 824.
160. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 450.
161. See id. (citing Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824) ("American's contracts must have
legal force because the stability and efficiency of the market depended on the enforce
ment of agreements.").
162. See id. (citing Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824).
163. Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988) (repealed 1994) (current version at
49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1994))).
164. See id. (citing Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 826).
165. Id. (citing Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824 n.6).

Id.
167. Id.

166.
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could not be "any suggestion that RFEIRL agreed to the
mandatory retirement provision in order to evade the [ADEA]."l68
The court supported its contention by indicating that the provisions
in the collective bargaining agreement requiring termination at age
sixty-five were common throughout the German labor force. 169
Mahoney reached closure in the fall of 1995, when the
Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certio
rari,11o Nevertheless, the court of appeals did not deliver an un
challengeable legal argument in finding for the defendant in
Mahoney. The following section will look at the reasoning used by
the Mahoney court with a critical eye, attempting to shed light on
the strengths and weaknesses of the opinion.
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

In reaching an understanding of the pertinent issues in Maho
ney, this section will separately consider three perspectives. The
first part will involve a comparison of Norfolk & Western, Wolens,
and Mahoney. Next, the role of the EEOC will be discussed, with a
focus on ascertaining what weight the view of the EEOC should
have been given by the court of appeals in Mahoney. Fmally, the
legal analysis will conclude with a possible alternative explanation
for the Mahoney result and a discussion of the strength of the court
of appeals decision as future precedent.
A. Norfolk & Western, Wolens, and Mahoney
By using both Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. American
Train Dispatchers' Ass'n l71 and American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens 172
as support for its holding, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit created many more questions than
it answered. Though both Norfolk & Western and Wolens involved
private contractual obligations and statutory provisions that limited
the coverage of the ICA and the ADA, respectively,173 the two
168. [d. at 451.
169. See id.
170. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 181 (1995).
171. 499 U.S. 117 (1991). See supra notes 69-83 and accompanying text for the
full discussion of Norfolk & Western.
172. 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995). See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text for the
full discussion of Wo/ens.
173. In Norfolk & Western, the relevant provision of the leA, § 11341(a), was an
exemption provision, see supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text; while in Wo/ens, the
relevant provision of the ADA, § 1305(a)(1), was a preemption provision, see supra
notes 85-86 and accompanying text. Both provisions result in the suspension of law.
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cases reach completely opposite results. In Norfolk & Western, the
Court found the exemption provision "from the antitrust laws and
from all other law, including State and municipal law" to include a
collective bargaining agreement between the parties. 174 In Wolens,
however, the Court found the preemption provision of "any law,
rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and
effect of law" did not include, and therefore could not preempt,
private contracts between private parties. 175
In spite of the facial differences between Norfolk & Western
and Wolens, the court of appeals in Mahoney claimed that both
cases supported its holding. The court found the reasoning of Nor
folk & Western controlling with respect to the interpretation of
"law" within section 623(f)(1) of the ADEAp6 Additionally, the
court found the discussion by the Wolens majority of the impor
tance of contracts to support the result in Mahoney, which allowed
the private contract between the parties to the lawsuit to be
enforced. 177
Even though the Wolens reading of "law" left the private
agreement undisturbed, which is effectively the same result that the
Mahoney court reached with its interpretation of "law," the Maho
ney court claimed that the Norfolk & Western holding, which
achieved the opposite result of voiding a private agreement, was
controlling. The court selectively picked from the two Supreme
Court cases, using one to support its statutory construction and the
other to support its result.178 The Mahoney court attempted to dis
tinguish the facts and circumstances of Wolens from the comparable
facts and circumstances found in both Norfolk & Western and Ma
honey to establish that it correctly interpreted the statutory text. 179
The Mahoney court's conclusion that Norfolk & Western con
trolled the statutory interpretation is suspect. The most obvious
criticism of the court's assertion is that the 'statutory interpretation
The preemption provision always exempts compliance with contradictory laws, in con
trast to the exemption provision, which only allows exemption in certain situations. The
differences in application is effectively negated, however, because the issue in both
cases as it related to Mahoney was whether the term "law" was intended by Congress to
include contracts at all.
174. See Norfolk & Western, 499 U.S. at 127, 133.
175.' See Wolens, 115 S. Ct. at 824, 826.
176. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
177. See id. at 450.
178. See supra notes 149-67 and accompanying text for the Mahoney court's ap
plication of Norfolk & Western and Wolens.
179. See Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 450.
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of Wolens could just as easily have been used by the court as prece
dent on the meaning of "law." If the court had relied on Wolens,
then "laws" within section 623(f)(1) would mean only those laws
arising from the government, not those which seek to enforce pri
vate agreements. The result under this approach would then resem
ble the result in Norfolk & Western, where a statute excused
noncompliance with a collective bargaining agreement. The statute
in Mahoney would supersede the private agreement between the
parties. Although this result would place RFEIRL in a difficult sit
uation, the district court in Mahoney argued quite persuasively that
this type of dilemma is not of such significance that a court should
refuse to apply United States law,180
A second concern arising from the court of appeals's interpre
tation of section 623(f)(1) regards the court's reading of the statu
tory text of the ADEA when compared to the approaches used by
the Norfolk & Western and Wolens Courts. In Norfolk & Western,
the Court read the phrase "from the antitrust laws and from all
other law, including State and municipal law" to express on its face
congressional intent to include private agreements. 1S1 Neverthe
less, the Court looked beyond the statute to the agency opinion for
other indicia of support for its conclusion,182 In Wolens, the Court
first looked to the text of the statute, and then considered the facts
and circumstances, including the legislative history and the agency
interpretation, before concluding that "any law, rule, regulation,
standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law" did
not include private contracts. l83
It appears from Mahoney that the court of appeals initially
looked to the text of the statute. Instead of trying to determine if
the text clearly expressed congressional intent, however, the court
looked beyond the facts of the case and the language and legislative
history of the ADEA to a different case, Norfolk & Western, which
dealt with a different statute, the ICA. The court apparently did
not look to either the legislative history or the relevant agency in
terpretation before looking to Norfolk & Western. Under both
Norfolk & Western and Wolens, the court of appeals has deviated
180. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1992).
181. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American 1i'ain Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S.
117,127, 133 (1991).
182. See supra Part I.C.1.
183. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 824-26 (1995). See
supra note 90 for a further discussion of how the Court reached its conclusion.

484

WESTERN NEW "ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:455

from established Supreme Court approaches to resolving the tex
tual uncertainty.
The shortcomings of the court of appeals's approach in Maho
ney mayor may not have resulted in harm to the losing plaintiffs. If
the court reached a correct result in spite of its deficiencies, then
little or no harm has resulted. If, however, the court of appeals
wrongly interpreted section 623(f)(1), and thereby wrongly con
cluded that the defendant was exempt from the ADEA, then mani
fest harm has resulted. It is necessary to look for answers to this
question in other relevant sources, because the three important
cases, Norfolk & Western, Woiens, and Mahoney, fail to resolve the
problem.
B.

The Missing EEOC

A major problem in Mahoney was the court's failure to address
the views of the EEOC. 184 From the available agency materials,185
it appears certain that the EEOC would have agreed with the dis
trict court in Mahoney, which denied RFEIRL the section 623(f)(1)
defense. 186 The examples, included in the Policy Guidance on sec
tion 623(f)(1) of December 1989, aid greatly in understanding the
EEOC's belief as to the state of the law. Example 2 involved a
provision in a company charter, which was registered with the for
eign host state as required by law, that violated the ADEA.187
Compliance with the charter, even though the charter was regis
tered with the state, would be a violation of the ADEA because the
EEOC did not consider the charter to equate to "law" in the stat
ute. The Mahoney facts could be viewed as similar to this example,
184. According to the Supreme Court, deference to administrative agencies is
based on "the practical expertise which an agency normally develops" and "to accord
some measure of flexibility to ... an agency as ... new and unforeseen problems [arise]
over time." International Bhd. of Thamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979).
As discussed supra Part I.B.3, whether EEOC guidelines should be afforded the same
deference as agency regulations is an open question.
185. These materials were discussed in Part I.B of this Note. See supra notes 33
41 and accompanying text for a discussion of these materials; see also supra notes 117
20 and accompanying text for a discussion of the early procedural history of Mahoney.
Specifically, the materials include: two Policy Guidances on the ADEA, supra notes 33,
187, which include three examples of violations of the ADEA in a foreign setting, supra
notes 39-41 and accompanying text; the early stage of the Mahoney litigation materials,
in which the EEOC was a party to the lawsuit, supra notes 117-20; and a later Enforce
ment Guidance that stated the EEOC believed Mahoney to involve a clear violation of
the ADEA, supra note 118.
186. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1992).
187. See Policy Guidance, supra note 35, at 5121-22. See supra note 39 and ac
companying text for Example 2.
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if one views the charter and the collective bargaining agreement as

two privately created obligations that could lead to legal problems
if violated.
The fourth example could be viewed as even more determina
tive of the EEOC's view in a case like Mahoney. The example in
volved a foreign fee imposed on employers who employ workers
beyond age sixty-five. l88 The EEOC would not permit the em
ployer to assert a section 623(f)(1) defense based on the fee, be
cause the employer could pay the fee, continue to employ the
worker, and violate neither foreign law nor the ADEA. The exam
ple mandates a direct causation requirement.
In Mahoney, the collective bargaining agreement between
RFEIRL and the plaintiffs provided for a unilateral right of termi
nation with six months notice. l89 After the expiration of six
months, RFEIRL would be free to strike a new bargaining agree
ment with its workers that allowed American employees to con
tinue working past age sixty-five. l90 The new agreement might
require RFEIRL to grant concessions to the workers which had a
monetary value. Whether or not a cost was involved, at the very
least the process would be inconvenient. However, the direct cau
sation requirement established in Example 4 does not support cost
or difficulty as an acceptable reason within section 623(f)(1).
Rather, compliance with the law itself must cause the violation of
the ADEA. Therefore, using the reasoning of Example 4, RFEI
RL's violation of the ADEA was arguably caused not by German
law, but rather by RFEIRL's failure to terminate the collective bar
gaining agreement. Since "foreign law" did not cause RFEIRL's
violation, section 623(f)(1) would not apply. Both examples sup
port the view that the EEOC would have favored the district court
ruling.

Even more supportive of this conclusion was an EEOC gui
dance entitled Seniority Systems, Extraterritoriality, and Coverage of
188. See Policy Guidance, supra note 35, at 5123. See supra note 41 and accom
panying text for Example 4.
189. See supra note 141, indicating that the district court in Mahoney raised the
issue of the termination provision.
190. This argument assumes that RFEIRL would not be forced to terminate an
American employee until after the six month notice period expired. This contingency
would have been satisfied with respect to both plaintiffs William Mahoney and Roy De
Lon in Mahoney, since the ADEA was amended in 1984 and the plaintiffs were not
terminated until 1988 and 1987, respectively. See Mahoney v. RFFJRL, Inc., 47 F.3d
447, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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Federal Reserve Banks .191 The EEOC release, which came after the
district court decision in Mahoney, stated that the EEOC found
Mahoney to be a clear violation of the ADEA.192 The release im

plied that when the EEOC released the second set of ADEA guide
lines in 1989, it believed that the Mahoney facts involved a violation
of the ADEA.193
Since a published EEOC interpretation regarding section
623(f)(1) existed at the time of litigation, the court of appeals
should have at least acknowledged the opinion's existence, if not
considered it in resolving the case. This approach was seemingly
required by both Norfolk & Western and Wolens, as the Supreme
Court acknowledged in both cases that the Court. and the relevant
agency shared a common statutory interpretation. 194 Nevertheless,
the court cited to both Supreme Court cases without following the
approach used in both decisions. 195
Assuming that the EEOC did in fact consider RFEIRL's ac
tions as violative of the ADEA and not exempted by section
623(f)(1), then a relevant agency opinion existed at the time of trial.
1\vo issues must be addressed: (1) what standard of deference the
EEOC opinion should have received in Mahoney, and (2) how the
outcome in Mahoney would have been affected if the EEOC opin
ion was considered.
The Supreme Court cases of Skidmore v. Swift & CO.196 and
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 197
provide the two potential deference standards for EEOC guide
lines. 198 Which standard is correct hinges on the open question of
191. See Seniority Systems, Extrate"itoriality, and Coverage of Federal Reserve
Banks, EEOC Enforcement Guidance, No. N-915.002, Oct. 20, 1993, available in
WESTLAW, 1993 DLR 203 d27, at 34-35.
192. See id.
.
193. Although the EEOC did withdraw from the Mahoney litigation, no indica
tion exists to show that the EEOC in any way believed that it wrongly alleged a viola
tion of the ADEA. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
194. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. American 1i'ain Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S.
117, 133-34 (1991); American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. a. 817, 824 n.6, 826
(1995).
195. See supra Part III.A for an evaluation of the Mahoney court's application of
Norfolk & Western and Wolens.
196. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
197. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
198. In both Skidmore and Chevron, deference to an agency is relevant only
when a statute is ambiguous. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text for a discus
sion of Skidmore and the Skidmore test. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Chevron and the Chevron test. The following analysis, which will
attempt to relate the EEOC interpretation of § 623(f)(1) to both Skidmore and Chev
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whether EEOC v. Arabian American Oil CO.,l99 which stated that
Skidmore controlled, supplanted the earlier decision EEOC v.
Commercial Office Products Co. ,200 which applied Chevron. Be
cause the proper standard of deference for EEOC guidelines is an
open question, it is appropriate to test the EEOC opinion under
both Skidmore and Chevron. 201
The EEOC promulgated its first guidelines on the meaning of
section 623(f)(1) in 1989. Under the Skidmore four factor test,202
the EEOC guidelines would likely fare well and deserve significant
deference. FIrst, the EEOC was very thorough in creating the Pol
icy Guidance on section 623(f)(1) of the ADEA, as it created five
explicit and detailed examples for use in understanding the mean
ing of the statute. Second, the EEOC appears to interpret section
623(f)(1) logically, as a narrow exception to the general rule that
ron, assumes that § 623(f)(1) is ambiguous and does not facially express congressional
intent. This assumption is supported by the court of appeals in Mahoney, which looked
to the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 11341(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act for
aid in construing § 623(f)(1). See supra notes 149-69 for the analysi~ used by the court
of appeals.
199. 499 U.S. 244 (1991). See supra notes 13-17 for a discussion of Arabian
American.
200. 486 U.S. 107 (1988).
201. Although Arabian American is a more recent decision, the Commercial Of
fice Prods. high deference standard appears to be better supported. First, Commercial
Office Prods. applied its standard of deference for EEOC guidelines, the reasonable
ness approach, to resolve the case. See Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. at 115. In
Arabian American, however, the Court did not use the Skidmore standard of deference
to decide the case. See supra text accompanying note 64, indicating that the Supreme
Court decided the relevant issue in Arabian American, whether TItle vn applied over
seas, on the failure of Congress to clearly express an affirmative intent to extend cover
age overseas. See supra- notes 13-15 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
clear-statement rule. Rather, the Court stated in dicta that the appropriate standard
was Skidmore. See Arabian Am., 499 U.S. at 257. As precedent, only Commercial Of
fice Prods. is controlling. Additionally, Justice Scalia persuasively argued in his Ara
bian American concurrence that the Skidmore approach, created forty years before
Chevron, was outdated and Chevron embodied the modem trend. See id. at 259-60
(Scalia, J., concurring).· For a more detailed discussion of Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Arabian American, see supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. Neverthe
less, an argument exists that since Chevron concerned only agency regulations, it has no
value as precedent with respect to agency guidelines. Therefore, Skidmore is the only
controlling precedent for agency guidelines. Since the Supreme Court has yet to offi
cially address this question, neither argument can effectively be accepted or rejected.
See generally Yavelberg, supra note 43, for a thorough discussion of this question.
202. The Skidmore four factor test, which courts use to determine the weight of
deference to give to agency guidelines, includes: (1) "the thoroughness evident in its
consideration," (2) "the validity of its reasoning," (3) "its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements," and (4) "all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to controL" Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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the ADEA covers Americans working for American companies in
foreign countries. Third, the EEOC pronouncement is not inconsis
tent with any previous agency interpretations, since the 1989 release
was the first to discuss the exception in section 623(f)(1). There are
no subsequent pronouncements on the statute that would cause a
contradiction. Finally, although the fourth prong is somewhat am
biguous, the EEOC's primary responsibility in the administration
and enforcement of the ADEA favors giving weight to the EEOC
guidelines.
Although the Skidmore factors support giving strong weight to
the EEOC opinion of section 623(f)(1), nothing requires a court to
ultimately defer to the agency. In contrast, the Chevron test, which
prohibits courts from simply ignoring an agency opinion, should
lead to a certain result with the EEOC guidelines. Under Chevron,
the only question to answer with an ambiguous statute and a corre
sponding agency interpretation is whether the agency interpretation
is reasonable.203 With respect to section 623(f)(1), the EEOC's de
termination that a collective bargaining agreement does not fall
within the definition of "law" appears reasonable, as stated above,
because it would make little sense for Congress to grant extraterri
torial effect to the ADEA if Congress planned to allow parties to
contract around the law. Additionally, the reasoning used in
Wolens supports the conclusion that the EEOC's opinion is reason
able. 204 Therefore, if the Chevron test was applied correctly, a
court would be obligated to defer to the EEOC's interpretation of
section 623(f)(1).
The court of appeals's exclusion of the EEOC's interpretation
of the "foreign laws" exception to the ADEA appears to have ad
versely affected the outcome in Mahoney. Under both Skidmore
and Chevron, the EEOC opinion of section 623(f)(1) should have
received some deference. Since the EEOC opinion appeared to
match the interpretation of the district court and conflict with the
interpretation of the court of appeals, the court of appeals was ar
guably wrong in finding for the defendant. In the final part, this
section of the Note will discuss an alternative legal means of resolv
ing the dispute in Mahoney. This final section will find common
203. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984).
204. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. a. 817,824,826 (1995) (hold
ing that the word "law" did not include private contractual agreements in the Airline
Deregulation Act).
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ground between the district court and the court of appeals in an
attempt to unravel the inconsistencies in Mahoney.
C. An Alternative Legal Approach

The evaluation of Mahoney thus far has focused on the con
cern that the court of appeals resolved the controversy in an inap
propriate manner.20S However, an inquiry into fairness will
demonstrate that, as between the plaintiffs and RFEIRL, the result
was correct. For future parties, however, the decision may be disas
trous. Under the assumption that neither the district court nor the
court of appeals resolved the controversy in a satisfactory manner,
this Note, considering retroactivity concerns, will propose a new
method of resolving the controversy that is both legally sound and
achieves fairness to the parties in Mahoney and future parties en
countering a similar concern.206
1. A Reevaluation of the Controversy Considering Fairness
to the Litigants

In Mahoney, the district court and court of appeals opinions
each achieved positive and negative results.207 Using the district
court approach, an employer violates the ADEA when it complies
with terms of a collective bargaining agreement that conflict with
the statute.208 It does not matter if the collective bargaining agree
ment was created before or after the effective date of the conflicting
statutory provision. In both instances, employers are subject to lia
bility for violating the ADEA. From a simple fairness approach, it
is less fair to subject an employer to liability when the employer
205. See supra Part UlA-B.
206. The discussion to follow introduces fairness concerns prior to evaluating the
question of retroactivity. Avoiding "the unfairness of imposing new burdens on persons
after the fact" is the basis for the presumption against applying statutes retroactively;
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,270 (1994); thereby making fairness a rele
vant consideration. A complete discussion of retroactivity is beyond the scope of this
Note. For a detailed discussion of Landgraf and the present state of the law concerning
retroactivity, see Michael D. Blanchard, Note, Statutory Construction of Section 541(a)
of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: A Presump
tion in Favor of Practical Reason, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 437 (1996).
207. For this paragraph, see generally the discussion of the district court opinion
in Mahoney, supra Part U.B.
208. In this discussion, the employers should be considered American employers
that employ American workers in a foreign country. The collective bargaining agree
ments should be considered foreign agreements between American employers and
American employees in the foreign country in which the employee works, and the
agreements are enforceable in that country.
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complied with a bargaining agreement created prior to the enact
ment of the law which caused the conflict. This hypothetical paral
lels the facts of Mahoney, where the collective "bargaining
agreement between RFEIRL and the plaintiffs was created in 1982,
but the ADEA did not make it unlawful to retire American work
ers in foreign countries at age sixty-five until 1984.209 In contrast,
no concern over fairness exists when the cQllective bargaining
agreement was created subsequent to the change in the statute that
made the bargaining agreement unlawful. In this instance, an em,;.
ployer has entered into an unlawful agreement. If the employer
enforces the unlawful agreement, if is subject to liability.
The court of appeals reversed the district court and applied an
opposite approach. 210 Using the court of appeals's approach, all
collective bargaining agreements equate to "foreign laws" as de
fined by section 623(f)(1). Therefore, any employer that complies
with a collective bargaining agreement in violation of the ADEA
will be excused from that statutory violation under the "foreign
laws" exception. Again, it does not matter if the collective bargain
ing agreement was created before or after the effective date of the
conflicting statutory provision. 211 In either instance the employer is
not subject to liability for violating the ADEA. From a simple fair
ness approach, it is less fair to exempt an employer from liability
when the employer negotiated the inclusion of a bargaining agree
ment term in conflict with the ADEA after the statute made the
provision unlawful. In this instance, an employer has in effect en
tered into an unlawful agreement, but avoids liability on a techni
cality. In contrast, the concern over fairness lessens when the
employer entered into the collective bargaining agreement prior to
the effective date of the law making a provision in the agreement
unlawful. This hypothetical also parallels the facts of Mahoney.
In both the district court and court of appeals approaches,
some form of unfairness results. With the district court, employers
209. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1984
amendments to the ADEA.
210. For this paragraph, see generally discussion of the court of appeals opinion in
Mahoney, supra Part IT.C.
211. This discussion assumes that the court of appeals's approach applies to both "
pre- and post-amendment agreements because the court's reading of § 623(f)(1), equat
ing a collective bargaining agreement with law, allows for no distinction. See supra Part
II.C for the discussion of the court of appeals's resolution of the controversy. The court
of appeals, however, did imply that an equitable exception was possible when defend
ants attempted to contract around the ADEA. See infra note 212 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the possible equitable exception.
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are subject to liability based on lawfully created collective bargain
ing agreements. With the court of appeals, employers are released
from liability on unlawfully created collective bargaining agree
ments. Without directly addressing the problem with pre-amend
ment agreements, the court of appeals implied that an exception to
section 623(f)(1) might be available in situations where employers
attempted to contract around the ADEA.212
Tension exists between the court of appeals's acknowledge
ment that equitable concerns are important and its holding that col
lective bargaining agreements equate to "laws" in section 623(f)(1).
Particularly troubling is the idea that a court must inquire into the
facts surrounding the enactment of a collective bargaining agree
ment containing a term that conflicts with the ADEA to determine
if it is "inequitable" to apply the law.213 If the court of appeals truly
212. The court of appeals did note that RFEIRL could not have attempted to
evade the ADEA by contracting around the statute because the collective bargaining
agreement in Mahoney pre-dated the change in the ADEA. See Mahoney v. RFE/RL,
Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1995). This statement by the court of appeals evidences
two significant beliefs. FIrst, the court of appeals was concerned with subjecting RFEI
RL to liability for complying with a lawfully negotiated agreement. Second, the court
of appeals believed that a contrary result was available if evidence existed that an em
ployer intentionally contracted around the ADEA to avoid compliance with impunity.
213. The need for an alternative approach is evidenced by a recent law review
article that stated, without any qualification, that '''[l]aws of the [foreign] country' has
been construed to include collective bargaining agreements." See Phillip I. Blumberg,
The Increasing Recognition of Enterprise Principles in Determining Parent and Subsidi
ary Corporation Liabilities, 28 CoNN. L. REv. 295, 342 n.174 (1996). The possibility of
an equitable exception implied in Mahoney will not ensure certain and consistent appli
cation of the ADEA abroad. The court of appeals in Mahoney simply noted that the
enactment of the discriminatory clause prior to the 1984 amendments foreclosed any
possibility "that RFEIRL agreed to the mandatory retirement provision in order to
evade the [ADEA]." Mahoney, 47 F.3d at 451. The language neither provides a court
with guidance on how to determine if an employer was attempting to evade the ADEA
nor does it provide guidance on what action the court should take if the court deter
mines that the employer attempted to evade the ADEA. Additionally, the unqualified
statement in the above article that the "foreign laws" exception includes collective bar
gaining agreements suggests that courts may simply ignore or overlook the conduct of
employers before applying the exclusionary provision of § 623(f)(1). These concerns
are further exacerbated by the fact that TItle VII contains an exclusion provision
modeled after § 623(f)(1). See supra note 19. Analogous legal reasoning could result in
employers avoiding liability for discrimination based on sex, race, national origin, or
religion provided the collective bargaining agreements mandated such discrimination.
Cf. See Seniority Systems, Extraterritoriality, and Coverage of Federal Reserve Banks,
EEOC Enforcement Guidance, No. N-915.002, Oct. 20, 1993, available in WESTLAW,
1993 DLR 203 d27, at 34-35 (The EEOC release noted that "[a]lthough [the district
court opinion in Mahoney was] decided under the ADEA ..., the reasoning of Maho
ney is equally applicable to analysis of the foreign laws defense under TItle VII ...."
By negative inference, the court of appeals's approach in Mahoney can also be applied
to the TItle VII exception provision).
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believes this approach is correct, it has created a strange process for
the evaluation of the adjudicability of age discrimination claims like
that found in Mahoney. It is possible that the court of appeals in
Mahoney was truly concerned with punishing the defendant for ex
ercising its lawfully negotiated contract right of mandatory retire
ment, yet found no alternative legal theory to address this concern.
2. The Defendant's Argument at Trial
The evaluation of the equities of the district court and court of
appeals opinions in Mahoney evidences (l) unfairness to employees
when no liability results from post-amendment agreements and (2)
unfairness to employers when liability results from pre-amendment
agreements. To avoid the unfairness in both scenarios, the ADEA
must apply to foreign collective bargaining agreements, but only to
ones created after the statute became extraterritorial. This solution
concerns redefining the effective date of the amended statute.
In recognizing that a different effective date for the amend
ment could resolve the dispute in Mahoney, an interesting question
arises-whether the debate over the meaning of the statute should
have instead been a debate over coverage of contractual obligations
that existed at the time of amendment. Essentially, this question
addresses the issue of retroactivity. The inquiry into this question is
two-fold: (1) does the application of section 623(f)(1) to pre-1984
collective bargaining agreements create a retroactive effect and, if
so, (2) does section 623(f)(1) apply retroactively.214 The focus of a
debate over retroactive effect would be on the time of RFEIRL's
discriminatory act. If the discriminatory act occurred prior to 1984,
at the time of the creation of the collective bargaining agreement,
then the 1984 amendments to the ADEA would have to apply ret
roactively in order to make RFEIRL's collective bargaining agree
ment unlawful. By contrast, if the discriminatory act occurred upon
the termination of the plaintiffs, which was after the ADEA be
came effective overseas, then no retroactivity concerns would exist.
At trial, the defendant raised the issue of retroactivity, arguing
that it lawfully discharged the plaintiffs because the collective bar
gaining agreement preceded the 1984 amendment to the ADEA.21S
The district court, while acknowledging that an argument existed
214. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505 (1994). In reality, the
second question is not in dispute. In a previous case involving the same defendant,
RFEIRL, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the 1984 amendments did not
apply retroactively. See Ralis v. RFEIRL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
215. See Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1992).
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that the time of discrimination was the time of contracting, found
the argument unpersuasive. 216 The judge found Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc. ,217 to support the defendant's argument, but also
to foreclose the application of the argument in Mahoney.218
Lorance involved the determination of the time of discrimina
tion for statute of limitations purposes with the adoption of a
facially neutral seniority system.219 The district court found that,
although Lorance held that the relevant time of discrimination in
the case of a facially neutral seniority system was the time of its
creation, the Supreme Court nevertheless acknowledged "that a
facially discriminatory system ... can be challenged at any time,
because such a system 'by definition discriminates each time it is
applied."'220 Applying this rationale to Mahoney, the district court
found the relevant time of discrimination to be the time of dis
charge.221 A more detailed explanation of the district court's con
clusion with regard to the relevant timing is necessary in order to
understand the true nature of the defendant's concern.
3. The Domestic Setting: The Tune of Amendment
Determines Retroactivity Analysis
To evaluate the district court's determination that the time of
termination was the relevant measuring time for a statutory viola
tion, it is necessary to consider the underlying legal reasons sup
porting the conclusion. The issue in Mahoney, in the broadest
sense, concerned the legality of terminating employees solely based
on their age. With the 1984 amendment to the ADEA, Americans
working abroad for United States companies obtained new protec
tion that previously existed only domestically.222 This amendment
created a "public right" in all of society, not just workers affected
by the change. According to the Supreme Court, a "public right,"
in contrast to a "private right," is "a statutory right ... closely inter
twined with a federal regulatory program Congress has the power
to enact" or a right that "belongs to [or] exists against the Federal
Government."223
216. See id. at 4-5.
217. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
218. See Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 4-5.
219. See Lorance, 490 U.S. 900.
220. Mahoney, 818 F. Supp. at 5 (quoting Lorance, 490 U.S. at 912 n.5).
221. See id.
222. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1984
amendments to the ADEA.
223. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989).
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Employment discrimination statutes by their very nature con
cern "public rights."224 Such statutes, created by Congress, estab
lish rights in all of society, or an identifiable portion of society.
Prior to the enactment of these statutes, no such right exists in the
public.
Concerning the time of discrimination with a "public right,"
Supreme Court precedent establishes that "public rights" warrant
different treatment than "private rights." The Court, in cases con
cerning the "public rights" associated with federal wage and hour
laws under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),225 "ha[s] held
that congressionally granted FLSA rights take precedence over
conflicting provisions in a collectively bargained compensation ar
rangement. "226 In elaborating on the purpose of the FLSA, the
Court found that:
Congress intended . . . to achieve a uniform national policy of
guaranteeing compensation for all work or employment engaged
in by employees covered by the Act. Any. . . contract falling
short of that basic policy, like an agreement to pay less than the
minimum wage requirements, cannot be utilized to deprive em
ployees of their statutory rights. 227

The Court's discussion establishes that "public rights" create new
rights by elevating one's protections rather than by destroying pre
existing obligations.
Congress created "public rights" with the FLSA and "public
rights" with the ADEA and Title VII in an analogous fashion. With
the employment discrimination statutes, Congress elevated societal
224. See, e.g., Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 737-38
(1981) (Supreme Court stating that "in enacting Title VII, Congress had granted indi
vidual employees a nonwaivable, public law right to equal employment opportunities
..." (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974»); Fisher v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 547 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that Title vn
protects "important public rights"); Home v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc.,
489 F. Supp. 465, 469-70 (D. Mass. 1980) (court equated the importance of the Title vn
public rights recognized in Gardner-Denver with the ADEA protections); EEOC v.
American Nat'l Bank, 420 F. Supp. 181, 185 (E.D. Va. 1976) (noting that "[t]he EEOC
indeed has a duty to vindicate the important public rights secured to all citizens under
Title VII") (citation omitted).
225. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). The Supreme Court has long found the FLSA
to involve "public rights." See Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 739-41 and cases cited therein.
226. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740-41 (citing Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning
Co., 327 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1946); Walling v. Hamischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427, 430-32
(1945); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161,
166-67, 170 (1945».
227. Id. at 741 (quoting Tennessee Coal, Iron & RR Co. v. Muscoda Local No.
123, 321 U.S. 590, 602-03 (1944».
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protections to the level of "public rights." As a result, contractual
agreements inconsistent with these later statutes must necessarily
yield just as contractual wage agreements below the FLSA's mini
mum wage yielded with that earlier statute's passage. Regarding
the enactment of the 1984 amendments to the ADEA, non-exempt
contracts and collective bargaining agreements228 that included pro
visions violating the ADEA could no longer be enforced, including
the mandatory age sixty-five termination clause included in the col
lective bargaining agreement between RFEIRL and the Mahoney
plaintiffs. 229
Relating the "public rights" aspect of the 1984 amendment to
the district court's conclusion that the disputed collective bargain
ing agreement discriminates at the time of termination, it is appar
ent that the district court reached the correct conclusion under
existing law and precedent, which presently covers only the domes
tic setting. Once Congress changed the ADEA, no agreements
equivalent to that in Mahoney could lawfully be enforced beyond
the effective date of the statute.
4. The Foreign Setting: A Proposal That the TIme of
Contracting Controls Retroactivity Analysis
Returning to the earlier fairness discussion,230 the correctness
of the district court's decision by no means obviates the resulting
unfairness to the defendant under that court's approach. A future
litigant may well be placed in the same predicament that RFEIRL
encountered as a result of the district court's decision-terminate
people like the plaintiffs and be subject to liability under the
ADEA231 or continue to employ people like the plaintiffs and vio
late German labor law by unilaterally changing a term of the collec
tive bargaining agreement.232 A new approach is therefore
necessary in situations like Mahoney where parties in foreign coun
tries are legally obligated to follow two contradictory policies.
The basis for the proposed approach is based on the distinction
between the domestic setting and the foreign setting. If Mahoney
228. See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exception
from foreign coverage included in § 623(f)(1) of the ADEA.
229. Essentially. RFEJRL's contractual right to follow its collective bargaining
agreement tennination clause gave way to the public's right to see employees like the
Mahoney plaintiffs continue in their jobs. See supra Part II.A for the facts of Mahoney.
230. See supra Part III.C.l.
231. See generally district court opinion in Mahoney, supra Part II.B.
232. See supra note 109 (indicating that a unilateral change violates Gennan law).
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was a domestic case, the employer could not have lawfully termi
nated a sixty-five year old employee covered by an agreement like
that in Mahoney. On the other hand, no labor union could seek to
force that employer to comply with the invalid termination provi
sion. Essentially, an employer would lose the right to enforce the
collective bargaining agreement, but would be insulated from liabil
ity for failing to do so. In Mahoney, however, under the district
court's approach, American law forbade RFEIRL from enforcing
the termination clause while German labor law compelled it to en
force the agreement. The result left RFEIRL in a "Catch-22," with
inevitable liability.
The proposed approach is to treat the agreement between
RFEIRL and the Mahoney plaintiffs as a "private right" between
the parties no different than any other individual contract right.
This approach assumes that the employer (1) remains bound by a
private agreement in a foreign country233 and (2) cannot avoid com
pliance with American employment discrimination law. When con
sidering the power of Congress in creating "public rights," treating
a binding foreign agreement as private is legally sound. In the do
mestic setting, Congress can effectively invalidate previously ex
isting obligations by creating new statutes. In the Mahoney setting,
Congress lacks the power to elevate American law over a foreign
contractual agreement. This distinction warrants the separate
treatment.
Applying this approach, the time of contracting would be con
sidered the relevant time rather than the time of termination. Be
cause the District of Columbia Circuit previously determined that
the 1984 amendment was not to be applied retroactively,234 the dis
trict court in Mahoney would have granted summary judgment in
favor of RFEIRL. This approach removes the problems of unfair
ness from the application of section 623(f)(1) noted above.235 No
employers would be subject to liability on collective bargaining
agreements created prior to 1984 and no employers would escape
liability on collective bargaining agreements created after 1984. In
the first instance, the rights of an employer would be protected. In
the second instance, the rights of an employee would be protected.
With the proposed alternative approach presented in this Note,
233. If the employer is not bound by a foreign agreement, that employer has no
basis to avoid complying with American law under § 623(f)(1) and is specifically ex
cluded from this proposed approach.
234. See supra note 214.
235. See supra Part III.C.1.
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no foreign collective bargaining agreement negotiated before the
1984 amendments to the ADEA would be covered by the statute.
This approach obviates the need to stretch the definition of "laws of
the [foreign] country" within section 623(f)(1) to include collective
bargaining agreements, a reading of the statute criticized by this
Note. Indeed, under the alternative approach, every foreign agree
ment containing an age-based discriminatory provision in conflict
with the ADEA would have been negotiated after the 1984 amend
ment to the ADEA prohibited employers from committing such
discrimination. The court of appeals's reading of the statute, on the
other hand, would authorize, and possibly encourage, employers to
contract around the ADEA. This reading of the "foreign laws" ex
ception could not reflect the intent behind section 623(f)(1), as both
the district court and the court of appeals expressed concern over
employers attempting to contract around American law. Thus, the
only plausible construction of the statute as applied to post-amend
ment agreements would be the district court's, where American
statutory laws remain supreme over contractual provisions.
CONCLUSION

Mahoney v. RFEIRL, Inc. presents two related questions.
FIrst, the question of what constitutes a "foreign law," allowing an
employer to avoid compliance with the ADEA, was pivotal to the
outcome of the case. The district court and court of appeals
reached opposite conclusions on the viability of the defendant's for
eign law defense. Congress provided the courts no help in reaching
a conclusion, as legislative history is lacking for the ADEA and
other related employment discrimination statutes that apply extra
territorially. The only possible direct guidance on the question was
a published EEOC interpretation of the statute which, ironically,
neither court chose to mention.
This ironic point leads to the second issue raised by Mahoney.
The question of what level of judicial deference EEOC interpreta
tions merit is one that continues to be unresolved. A debate over
the proper standard of deference to afford the EEOC-a debate
between the Skidmore and Chevron tests--could have provided
strong arguments to aid in the resolution of Mahoney, but neither
the lower court opinion nor the appellate court opinion indicates
that the agency interpretation was considered in the outcome of the
case. Yet, by omission, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit made the agency opinion relevant. By simply ig
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noring the EEOC and reaching a conclusion in conflict with the
agency position, the court appeared to commit error because both
available tests supported some degree of deference.
In looking to an alternative approach, this Note attempts to
resolve seemingly unanswered questions from Mahoney. The need
for a different method of resolving the case is apparent when fair
ness concerns are highlighted. Essentially, the court of appeals
reached a fair result on the facts of Mahoney at the potentially high
cost of interfering with congressional intent to apply American law
in foreign settings. By contrast, the district court properly inter
preted the narrow reach of the foreign laws exception, but reached
an unfair result on the facts of Mahoney. To avoid both unfairness
and the thwarting of Congress's will, this Note proposes a retroac
tivity-based approach which would effectuate a proper balance of
law and equity.
Andrew P. Walsh

